The class of process-dissociation models, a subset of the class of multinomial processing-tree models, is one of the best understood classes of models used in experimental psychology. A number of prominent debates have addressed fundamental assumptions of process-dissociation models, leading, in many cases, to conceptual clarifications and extended models that address identified issues. One issue that has so far defied empirical clarification is how to evaluate the invariance assumption for the dominant process. Violations of the invariance assumption have, however, the potential to bias conventional processdissociation analyses in different ways, and they can cause misleading theoretical interpretations and conclusions. Based on recent advances in multinomial modeling, we propose new approaches to examine the invariance assumption empirically and apply them in 6 studies to 3 prominent fields of application of process-dissociation models: to the Stroop task, to the interplay of recollection and habit in cued recall, and to the study of racial bias in the weapon task. In each of these content domains, the invariance assumption is found to be violated to a considerable extent.
Process-dissociation models aim at disentangling the contributions of two processes to observed behavior in a given paradigm. Each process generates a response proposal with a certain probability. One of the processes, the dominant process, is assumed to determine the observable response, if and when it generates a response proposal, whatever the outcome of the second process. The second, nondominant process determines the observable response only when the dominant process does not generate a response proposal. 1 Historically, process-dissociation models were first proposed by Jacoby (1991) and Jacoby, Toth, and Yonelinas (1993) as a means to go beyond task-dissociation approaches in memory research. Jacoby and coworkers argued that tasks are rarely process-pure. Performance in almost any task is a function of several processes working, sometimes in concert and sometimes in opposition. A characteristic feature of the process-dissociation framework is that performance is contrasted in two tasks or conditions, to which we will refer as the inclusion condition and the exclusion condition-in the inclusion condition, the two processes of interest work in concert, facilitating performance; in the exclusion condition, they work in opposition.
For example, Jacoby (1991) devised a two-list recognitionmemory paradigm in which participants study two lists of items. In a subsequent test phase, participants are shown the studied items from both lists as well as new items. In an inclusion condition, participants are instructed to respond "old" to items from both lists and "new" to new items; in an exclusion condition, they are instructed to respond "old" to List 2 items and "new" to all other items, including those from List 1. Jacoby argued that two processes determine responses in these conditions, termed "recollection" and "familiarity." Considering only List 1 items, familiarity proposes an "old" response with a certain probability F in the inclusion as well as in the exclusion condition. With probability R, recollection also proposes an "old" response in the inclusion condition, but a "new" response in the exclusion condition. In the inclusion condition, both processes thus operate in concert when both propose an "old" response, leading to facilitation. In the exclusion condition, both processes are placed in opposition inas-much as only familiarity can lead to an "old" response, whereas recollection leads to a "new" response. Recollection is assumed to be the dominant response, whereas familiarity captures the response only if recollection fails. This leads to the typical processdissociation equations: P(response " old " | List 1 item, inclusion condition) ϭ R ϩ (1 Ϫ R)F, and P(response " old " | List 1 item, exclusion condition) ϭ (1 Ϫ R)F.
Although the two-list recognition-memory paradigm continues to be used (e.g., Joordens, Walsh, & Mantonakis, 2013) , a surprising diversity of paradigms has been developed within this general framework and applied to many research questions. Additional paradigms dissecting memory processes are a word-stem completion paradigm (Jacoby et al., 1993 ) and a habit-recollection paradigm (Hay & Jacoby, 1996) . Process-dissociation paradigms and models have also been proposed for the study of implicit sequence learning (Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2001 ; see also Buchner, Steffens, Erdfelder, & Rothkegel, 1997) , the own-race effect in recognition memory (Marcon, Susa, & Meissner, 2009) , the Stroop task (Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994) , the study of biases in judgment and decision making (Ferreira, Garcia-Marques, Sherman, & Sherman, 2006) , the study of moral decision making (Conway & Gawronski, 2013) , stereotypes (Hense, Penner, & Nelson, 1995; Sherman, Groom, Ehrenberg, & Klauer, 2003) and prejudice (Payne, 2001) , persuasion and the illusion-of-truth effect (Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992; Moons, Mackie, & Garcia-Marques, 2009 ), evaluative conditioning (Hütter, Sweldens, Stahl, Unkelbach, & Klauer, 2012) , cognitive aging (Toth & Parks, 2006) , and spontaneous trait inference (McCarthy & Skowronski, 2011) , among others.
Applications of these paradigms and models are thus not only found in memory research and cognitive psychology (for a review, see Yonelinas & Jacoby, 2012) but also in social psychology (for a review, see Payne & Bishara, 2009 ), psychopharmacology (Kirchner & Sayette, 2003) , developmental psychology (e.g., Jacoby, 1999; Toth & Parks, 2006) , neuropsychology (e.g., Amodio, 2009) , research on individual differences (Joordens et al., 2013) , and comparative psychology (Tu & Hampton, 2013) , among others. The process-dissociation framework has provoked careful scrutiny and analysis that, in some cases, led to conceptual clarifications and the formulation of extended models addressing identified problems. These discussions revolved around central assumptions of process-dissociation models, comprising an independence assumption, an invariance assumption for the nondominant process, and an invariance assumption for the dominant process. The focus of the present manuscript is on the invariance assumption for the dominant process, but it is necessary to summarize the previous work focusing on the other two assumptions first.
As explained by Jacoby (1991) , one assumption, termed the "independence assumption," is that the dominant process and the nondominant process operate independently. In a prominent debate (Curran & Hintzman, 1995 , 1997 Jacoby, 1998; Jacoby, Begg, & Toth, 1997; Jacoby & Shrout, 1997) , independence was clarified to comprise three facets: stochastical independence, aggregation independence, and functional independence. Stochastical independence refers to the assumption that the two processes operate independently within each trial. One way to state this is to say that for each individual trial, the probability that the nondominant process generates a given response proposal is not a function of the outcome of the dominant process. Aggregation independence refers to the assumption that the parameter values for the two processes are not correlated across the trials over which researchers aggregate for data analysis (such as across items and/or participants). A third independence concept related to, but distinct from, the other two is sometimes called functional independence. Functional independence is given if the two processes can be manipulated independently of each other.
There is agreement that violations of aggregation independence can lead to distorted estimates of the nondominant process (Curran & Hintzman, 1995 , 1997 Jacoby & Shrout, 1997; Rouder, Lu, Morey, Sun, & Speckman, 2008) , including the potential to cause spurious dissociations (Brainerd, Reyna, & Mojardin, 1999) . Furthermore, testing for (violations of) aggregation independence is not straightforward as a statistical testing problem (Jacoby & Shrout, 1997; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 2012) .
A related assumption is homogeneity across the trials over which researchers aggregate (such as items, participants, or participant-item combinations). Homogeneity is the assumption that the parameter values of each process are the same for each such trial. Heterogeneity (i.e., violations of homogeneity across items or participants over which one aggregates) can bias standard errors, confidence intervals, and significance tests for the parameter estimates of the dominant and the nondominant process (e.g., Klauer, 2006) . Rouder et al. (2008) have recently proposed a hierarchical extension of the process-dissociation model that includes item and participant effects and allows one to assess and control for heterogeneity in, and possible correlations between, the two processes across items and/or participants. Application of the hierarchical model thereby considerably mitigates concerns regarding heterogeneity and aggregation bias. It remains to be seen whether its application will lead to a revision of conclusions drawn in the various substantive fields in which process-dissociation models are applied (see Pratte & Rouder, 2012 , for first evidence that this may be the case). The analyses reported for our experiments rest on hierarchically extended models.
Another assumption, which we refer to as the invariance assumption for the nondominant process, is that the nondominant process produces a given response proposal with equal probability under the inclusion condition as under the exclusion condition. For example, the Parameter F in the two-list recognition-memory paradigm needs not be indexed by inclusion versus exclusion condition because its value is assumed to be the same in both conditions. This assumption can sometimes be tested when neutral or baseline conditions exist in which the dominant process can make no contribution (e.g., Buchner, Erdfelder, & VaterrodtPlünnecke, 1995; Yonelinas, Regehr, & Jacoby, 1995) . Based on such tests, extensions of the original process-dissociation model capable of dealing with violations of the invariance assumption of the nondominant process have been proposed (Brainerd et al., 1999; Buchner et al., 1995; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1996) . This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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A further invariance assumption is that the dominant process produces a response proposal with equal probability under the inclusion condition as under the exclusion condition. For example, the Parameter R in the two-list recognition-memory paradigm needs not be indexed by inclusion versus exclusion condition because its value is assumed to be the same in both conditions. Like the other assumptions, this assumption has provoked debate (for the seminal two-list recognition-memory paradigm, see Graf, 1995; Graf & Komatsu, 1994; Komatsu, Graf, & Uttl, 1995; Toth, 1995; Toth, Reingold, & Jacoby, 1995;  for the word-stem completion paradigm, see Bodner, Masson, & Caldwell, 2000; Jacoby, 1998; Kinoshita, 2001; Richardson-Klavehn & Gardiner, 1996) .
The invariance assumption for the dominant process is generally considered difficult to test empirically because independent estimates for the dominant process under inclusion and exclusion conditions are typically not available (Jacoby, 1991; Komatsu et al., 1995; Toth et al., 1995) . Note, however, that De Houwer (1997) attempted to modify the word-stem completion paradigm to obtain such estimates. Furthermore, Brainerd et al. (1999;  see also Brainerd & Reyna, 2008; Brainerd, Reyna, Holliday, & Nakamura, 2012) extended the two-list recognition-memory paradigm, introducing an additional class of "related" distracters and an extended process-dissociation model with additional memory processes over and above recollection and familiarity, and with additional guessing processes in which tests of the invariance assumptions are possible. We return to these second-generation process-dissociation models for recognition memory in the General Discussion.
The focus of the present research is on this invariance assumption for the dominant process, to which we will simply refer as the invariance assumption in what follows, for the sake of brevity.
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We begin with a brief discussion of how parameter estimates, theoretical interpretations of process-dissociation analyses, and conclusions drawn from such analyses are affected if it is violated. Then, we derive methods for testing it and apply these to three prominent fields of application of process-dissociation models: to the Stroop task, to the study of memory, and to the study of racial bias in what is known as the "weapon task."
Violations of the Invariance Assumption: Parameter Estimates, Dissociations, and Theoretical Implications
Like for the independence assumption, a violation of the invariance assumption leads to bias in parameter estimates. As shown by Brainerd et al. (1999, Appendix) , if the dominant process is more likely to generate a response proposal in the inclusion than in the exclusion condition, the parameter for the nondominant process will be overestimated; if the invariance assumption is violated in the other direction, the parameter for the nondominant process will be underestimated. And the estimate for the dominant process cannot be correct because it takes on the same value for the inclusion condition as for the exclusion condition.
If the dominant and the nondominant processes are functionally independent of one another, then it should be possible to manipulate them independently of each other. An important empirical pattern sought after in process-dissociation research is therefore that of dissociations. A dissociation is established by a manipulation that affects the estimates of only one of the processes and leaves the estimates for the other process unchanged.
3 As pointed out by Brainerd et al. (1999) , violations of the invariance assumption can lead to spurious dissociations, that is, to patterns of estimates and significance tests that suggest dissociation although the manipulation under scrutiny affects both processes. This is also true of violations of aggregation independence. In response to such issues, Jacoby and colleagues have often pointed out that it would be surprising to find converging dissociations across different manipulations and studies consistently if they were spurious (e.g., Jacoby, 1998; Toth et al., 1995) . Yet the biases incurred by violations of the processdissociation assumptions are systematic ones that would be expected to replicate, given exact and even conceptual replications of the manipulations in question. Perhaps as harmful as spurious dissociations are spurious associations, in which the two processes appear to be both affected by a given manipulation, although the manipulation under scrutiny affects only one of them. Depending on whether homogeneity, aggregation independence, the invariance assumptions, several of these assumptions, or none of them are violated, observed patterns of process-dissociation parameter estimates-observed dissociations as well observed associations-can be interpreted differently. In some of these interpretations, the observed dissociation or association is spurious and in other interpretrations, it is substantial. This makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions on the basis of conventional process-dissociation analyses as further illustrated next.
Whether the untested invariance assumption is assumed to hold or not has often major consequences for the theoretical interpretation of observed data. The general argument has been spelled out clearly by Ratcliff, Van Zandt, and McKoon (1995) , who pointed out that the interpretation of observed data depends critically on the theoretical assumptions about the processes assumed to have generated the data. For example, Ratcliff et al. generated data for the two-list recognition-memory paradigm from a well-established one-process memory model (the search of associative memory model; Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984) and analyzed them using the process-dissociation model. This revealed the kind of dissociation that in the process-dissociation framework would have been seen as evidence for the operation of two processes. Ratcliff et al. (1995) point out that to escape such fallacies, it is desirable to be able to test underlying assumptions. In a similar vein, Brainerd et al. (1999) have highlighted the desirability of having goodnessof-fit tests for models, in general, and for process-dissociation models, in particular, as a ground-laying and legitimizing step for applying the model to substantive questions.
In fact, in many applications, it is plausible on theoretical grounds that the invariance assumption for the dominant process may be violated. We already mentioned early criticisms of the invariance assumption for the two-list recognition-memory paradigm and the word-stem completion paradigm, and we will discuss what substantive theories suggest regarding the invariance assumption for each of the three applications (i.e., for the Stroop task, for the interplay of recollection and habit in cued recall, and for the study of racial bias in the weapon task) that will be the focus of the empirical work of the present article. Let us first outline the common methods by means of which we will test the invariance hypothesis in these different domains, however.
Testing the Invariance Hypothesis: Overview
As already noticed by Jacoby et al. (1993) , the processdissociation model is formally equivalent to the two-highthreshold model of item recognition (e.g., Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) with equal probabilities for detecting old and new items. In the most basic recognition experiment, participants study items to be remembered later. In a subsequent test phase, they are shown the studied items mixed with new items, and their task is to discriminate studied items from new items. The two-highthreshold model has Parameters D o , for the probability of detecting that an old item is old, D n , for the probability of detecting that a new item is new, and b for guessing an "old" versus "new" response if detection fails. A standard assumption is that D o and D n are equal, with the common parameter denoted by
Estimating separate parameters for the dominant process under the inclusion and the exclusion condition, and testing these separate estimates for equality, is formally the same problem as estimating separate D o and D n parameters and testing them for equality. A well-known fact in the recognition-memory literature is that this can be achieved by manipulations of guessing bias (i.e., of Parameter b) that leave detection (i.e., D n and D o ) constant. Via the analogy with the process-dissociation model, this corresponds to a manipulation of the nondominant process that leaves the dominant process unaffected. An alternative possibility is to enrich the database by introducing a third response option to skip the response in case of uncertainty (Oravecz, Faust, & Batchelder, 2014; Singmann, Kellen, & Klauer, 2013) .
Manipulations of the nondominant process that are believed to leave the dominant process unaffected have been identified for all three domains that we focus on in this article-for the Stroop task (Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994) , for the memory paradigm that we study (the habit-recollection task; Hay & Jacoby, 1996) , as well as for perceptual-semantic discrimination tasks such as the weapon task (Payne, 2001) . For each of the three domains, we conducted an experiment implementing such a manipulation. This enables us to estimate the contribution of the dominant process separately for inclusion and exclusion conditions, and to test the separate estimates for equality. In addition, this enlarged database allows us to assess model fit for the resulting extended process-dissociation model with relaxed invariance assumption, satisfying a postulate by Brainerd et al. (1999; see also Ratcliff et al., 1995) . Because of the previously discussed problems caused by aggregation bias, we fit hierarchical extensions of the relaxed process-dissociation models (Klauer, 2010; Matzke, Dolan, Batchelder, & Wagenmakers, 2013; Rouder et al., 2008) , including item and participant factors as far as possible, to safeguard against the possibility of spurious dissociations or, alternatively, spurious violations of invariance. We will refer to the relaxed model as M 1 in each content domain examined in the empirical part of the paper. Note that Model M 1 is designed for the purpose of measuring the dominant process separately for inclusion and exclusion conditions: It is a tool to test the invariance hypothesis. We do not propose it as a new substantive model for the applications in question, although doing so is one possible response if violations of the invariance assumption are found and M 1 fits the data well, as discussed later.
These analyses rest on the auxiliary assumption that the implemented manipulation leaves the dominant process unaffected as intended. We refer to the assumption as auxiliary because its role is to help us to estimate the dominant process separately in inclusion and exclusion conditions. Its epistemological status is the same as that of the other assumptions that jointly define the process-dissociation models fitted here. The manipulations that we used were proposed, and the auxiliary assumption tested in previous work, often by the proponents of the process-dissociation models in question, as we point out for each relevant instance. The ensemble of model assumptions, including the auxiliary assumption, is furthermore tested by the mentioned goodness-of-fit tests in a summary fashion for the present data. Nevertheless, previous work was based on empirical dissociations in finding support for the auxiliary assumption. Given the just-discussed possibilities of spurious dissociations, we also strive for more explicit and focused tests of the assumption.
One way of testing it in a more focused manner is to fit a regular process-dissociation model, M 2 , that is as similar as possible to M 1 , with the difference that it enforces the invariance assumption but not the auxiliary assumption. Thus, M 2 provides separate estimates for the dominant process across the levels of the manipulation believed to leave that process unaffected. Model selection techniques suited to hierarchical models (Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin, & Van Der Linde, 2002) are then employed to gauge the relative evidence for the two possibilities embodied by the two models: (a) that the invariance assumption is violated while the auxiliary assumption holds (M 1 ) versus (b) that the invariance assumption holds while the auxiliary assumption is false, contrary to previous claims (M 2 ).
In addition, for each domain, we conduct a second experiment for control purposes. The second experiment either tests the auxiliary assumption more directly (i.e., without complex model estimation or fit techniques), or it implements an alternative test of the invariance assumption via a skip option (Oravecz, et al., 2014; Singmann et al., 2013) that is not predicated on the auxiliary assumption to begin with.
For all experiments, we aimed at an N of about 40 per condition, with an exception being the first experiment on the weapon task (Study 5) for which we sampled more participants (N ϭ 168), because pilot testing suggested that the relatively small size of racial-bias effects in the weapon task necessitated more test power to obtain clear-cut results. Moreover, in Study 6, we aimed at an N of 48 in order to have exactly one participant represent each of 48 counterbalancing conditions.
The Stroop Task
In a trial of the Stroop task, a color word (e.g., red) is printed in either the same color (i.e., red; congruent trial) or another color (e.g., yellow; incongruent trial), and participants are to name the color in which the word is printed as fast as possible, ignoring word meaning. The Stroop effect is the finding that performance is poorer in incongruent than in congruent trials.
The process-dissociation model of the Stroop task (Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994 ; see also Hillstrom & Logan, 1997; Jacoby, Lindsay, & Hessels, 2003; Trainham, Lindsay, & Jacoby, 1997) assumes This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
that performance in the Stroop task is determined by two independent processes-word reading and color naming. Word reading is the dominant process, suggesting the written color word as response with probability W; color naming successfully suggests the color response with probability C. Congruent trials of the Stroop task constitute the inclusion condition, and incongruent trials constitute the exclusion condition. Taken together, the model equations for the accuracy data of the Stroop task are P(respond with stimulus color | congruent trial) ϭ W ϩ (1 Ϫ W)C, and P(respond with stimulus color | incongruent trial) ϭ (1 Ϫ W)C.
Recent findings of item-specific control of Stroop interference suggest that the invariance assumption may be violated. Specifically, Jacoby et al. (2003) demonstrated that the size of the Stroop effect is a function of the proportion of congruent items at the level of specific items. For example, consider a sublist in which two colors and color words, red and blue, are presented mostly in congruent trials, mixed with a sublist in which two other colors and color words, green and yellow, are presented mostly in incongruent trials. Stroop effects are considerably more pronounced in the first (mostly congruent) sublist than in the second (mostly incongruent) sublist. This suggests that some form of contingency learning and/or control operates at the item level (Blais, Robidoux, Risko, & Besner, 2007; Jacoby et al., 2003; Schmidt & Besner, 2008) . The theoretical explanations of this phenomenon are currently under debate and differ in many respects-for example, with regard to whether control is exerted at the level of specific colors or specific words (Blais et al., 2007) , or whether some form of contingency-learning is involved (Schmidt & Besner, 2008) .
Consider the role of contingency learning first. One possibility is that frequently repeated stimuli come to enjoy a speed and accuracy advantage because of repetition priming creating an associative shortcut between the stimulus and the appropriate response (Blais et al., 2007; Logan, 1990) . This would account for item-specific congruency-proportion effects, and it would also account, in part, for the regular Stroop effect in standard lists in which each congruent stimulus is typically presented more often than each incongruent stimulus (Dishon-Berkovits & Algom, 2000; Melara & Algom, 2003) . Such an associative advantage for frequent congruent stimuli would further strengthen the association between the stimulus and the response based on word meaning for congruent items. This reasoning predicts a violation of the invariance assumption in the form of W I Ͼ W E , where I and E stand for inclusion and exclusion conditions, respectively. Remember that the inclusion and exclusion conditions are defined by congruent and incongruent Stroop trials, respectively.
A similar argument can be made for the possibility of control operating at the level of items. A conflict-monitoring mechanism would learn across repetitions of the individual congruent stimuli that there is little need to inhibit the word response for these stimuli. No such learning can take place for the incongruent stimuli, because relaxing control in this manner leads to errors for these items. In consequence, the contribution of word-reading processes would be greater for congruent relative to incongruent stimuli, implying W I Ͼ W E . Studies 1 and 2 examine the invariance assumption of the processdissociation model of the Stroop task. According to Lindsay and Jacoby (1994) , degrading colors affects the nondominant colornaming process (Parameter C) and leaves the dominant word-reading process (Parameter W) unaffected. Study 1 capitalized on this manipulation for a test of the invariance assumption. Study 2 was a control experiment providing a direct experimental test of the assumption that word-reading processes are not affected by the color-degradation manipulation.
Study 1
Method. Like in Lindsay and Jacoby (1994, Experiment 2) , a response deadline of 800 ms was used to provoke a medium amount of errors in the Stroop task. Unlike in Lindsay and Jacoby, there were three, rather than only two, degrees of color degradation to generate additional degrees of freedom for a meaningful modelfit test. Furthermore, whereas color degradation was a betweenparticipants factor in Lindsay and Jacoby, color degradation was implemented as a within-participants manipulation. This makes it possible to deal with possible violations of homogeneity and aggregation independence via a hierarchical-model analysis, as further elaborated on in the Data-analysis section.
Materials and procedure. Studies 1 through 4 were run on PCs with a 58-cm LCD monitor and a resolution of 1980 ϫ 1020 pixels and a seating distance of approximately 60 cm. The stimuli for Study 1 were the words "blue," "green," "yellow," and "red," and strings of percentage signs ("%%%%" or "%%%%%"). They were presented in a 36-pt Lucida Sans Demibold font. On each trial, one of them was presented in one of the four colors in the center of a light gray computer screen.
There were 360 experimental trials (72 nonletter control trials, 144 incongruent trials, and 144 congruent trials). The incongruent trials presented the 12 possible incongruent items that can be formed by crossing the four word meanings and the four word colors, and leaving out items with identical word color and word meaning (i.e., the congruent items). Each incongruent item was repeated 12 times across the 144 incongruent trials. The congruent trials presented the four congruent items, each of them in 36 trials.
The color coordinates were adjusted to create three degrees of color degradation. In a bright-colors condition, the colors were highly saturated and typical exemplars of the color in question; in a medium-colors condition, and more so in a dull-colors condition, the colors were less saturated and less easily discriminated. In several pilot studies, the color coordinates had been adjusted so as to provoke significant and approximately equal declines (on an arcsine-transformed scale) in overall color-naming accuracy across the three degradation conditions, with accuracy being far from floor and ceiling of the accuracy scale for each degradation condition. 4 One third of the repetitions of each individual item was presented in each degradation condition.
The experimental trials were preceded by 90 practice trials randomly sampled from the 360 experimental trials. All trials were presented in a random order determined anew for each participant.
Participants were instructed to name the color of each stimulus before an 800-ms deadline. The stimulus was taken off screen after 800 ms. An error tone sounded when participants did not respond prior to the deadline. Naming latency was registered by means of a voicekey, and the response was keyed in according to a color-key code by the experimenter if it had occurred prior to deadline. The next stimulus then appeared after 2,000 ms.
Participants. Participants were mostly students with different majors from the University of Freiburg. Data from one of 41 participants were lost because of a computer crash during the experimental session. The remaining 40 participants had a mean age of 24.3 years (SD ϭ 6.53; 26 female). They received partial course credit or a monetary compensation of €7 (approximately $9.63) for participating. One session took about 45 min.
Data analyses. As in Lindsay and Jacoby (1994) , nonletter control items were left out of the model analyses. For the modelbased analyses, we employed a hierarchical Bayesian extension of the process-dissociation model, including participant and item effects as far as identifiability concerns allow one to do this, following techniques proposed by Klauer (2010) , Matzke et al. (2013) , and Rouder et al. (2008) . Each parameter is thus considered to be a function of experimental conditions with additive participant and item effects to account for systematic differences between participants and items. For example, the parameter W for word reading is specified as W imck , where i indexes participants, m indexes word meaning, c indexes word color, and k indexes color-degradation condition, with
where ␣ mc is the effect of the mcth item with word meaning m and word color c, and ␤ imc is the ith participant effect for item mc. The function G establishes a link between these effects and the wordreading parameter. Such a link is necessary because the wordreading Parameter W quantifies a probability, constrained to range between 0 and 1, while the additive effects are real valued (Pratte & Rouder, 2012) . Following previous work (e.g., Klauer, 2010; Klauer, Hölzenbein, Calanchini, & Sherman, 2014; Matzke et al., 2013; Rouder et al., 2008) , we used a probit link.
In this specification of W, there is no effect of color-degradation condition k on the word-reading process, reflecting the auxiliary assumption that word reading is not affected by color degradation. W is, however, permitted to vary as a joint function of word meaning m and word color c (via ␣ mc ). In particular, it is thereby possible that W differs for congruent items (with m ϭ c) and incongruent items (with m c), allowing for a violation of the invariance assumption.
Parameter C for color naming, on the other hand, is a joint function of color-degradation condition k and word color c,
where ␥ ck is the joint effect of word color c and degradation condition k on color naming, with participant-specific deviation modeled by the ith participant effect ␦ ick . For identifiability reasons, it is not possible to let C also vary as a function of word meaning.
There are only four conditions for each of the item factors, Word Meaning and Word Color, and only three Color-Degradation conditions, so that these factors and their combinations were treated as fixed effects, whereas the participant factor was a random factor. That is, a hierarchical structure was imposed on the participant effects in the equations for the Parameters W and C, gaining further constraints. The participant effects are assumed to follow a multivariate normal distribution with zero mean and a variancecovariance matrix that is a free parameter to be estimated from the data. This structure pulls large effects toward zero, mitigating the influence of outliers, and allows one to account for and estimate correlations between parameters across participants, dealing with violations of homogeneity and aggregation independence that relate to participants and-inasmuch as the participant effects are nested within the item factors-to participant-item interactions. Furthermore, the analyses keep the different Stroop items apart via the separate item effects (i.e., the item-specific Parameters ␣ mc , in the equation for W, and ␥ ck , in the equation for C) as far as identifiability concerns allow one to do so, thereby also sidestepping the issue of aggregation bias related to items to a large extent. Lee and Wagenmakers (2013) and Rouder, Morey, and Pratte (in press ) provide introductions to Bayesian hierarchical modeling of this kind. A Bayesian approach to model estimation was necessary, because classical maximum likelihood estimation is computationally untractable for the present kind of model. This method provides model checks to assess goodness of fit (Klauer, 2010 ; see the Model checks section of the online supplemental materials for more details): Statistic T A summarizes how well the model accounts for the pattern of the 96 observed response frequencies in the design with factors Word Meaning (four levels), Word Color (four levels), Color Degradation (three levels), and Response Correctness (two levels), aggregated across participants and trials with identical items. T A corresponds to the goodness-of-fit statistic G 2 used in the traditional (non-Bayesian) approach to multinomial modeling (Batchelder & Riefer, 1999) . Note, in particular, that T A thereby tests whether the model adequately accounts for dependencies and covariations in the data caused by items, as reflected in the pattern of the 96 observed response frequencies. Model-check statistic T B summarizes how well the model accounts for the variances and correlations of these frequencies computed across participants as units. Note, in particular, that T B thereby tests whether the model adequately accounts for dependencies and covariations in the data caused by participants.
Furthermore, this approach yields credible intervals for the parameter estimates that can be interpreted much as classical confidence intervals, and it permits one-tailed hypothesis tests for equality between any two parameters. Note that the hypothesis tests reported in the Results sections all rely on directed hypotheses.
The model just specified (M 1 ) thus allows for a violation of the invariance hypothesis, as well as for item and participant effects, mitigating concerns regarding bias caused by violations of homogeneity and aggregation independence. Model M 1 rests on the assumption, following Lindsay and Jacoby (1994) , that the colordegradation condition does not affect the word-reading process. The auxiliary assumption is tested by the just-discussed model checks along with the other model assumptions.
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For a more focused assessment of the auxiliary assumption, we also estimated two models with the invariance assumption intact, but with word reading permitted to be a function of color degradation, following the logic outlined earlier (see the Testing the Invariance Hypothesis: Overview section). Specifically, for Model M 2a , W was specified to incorporate a joint effect ck of word color c and color degradation k, but no effect of word meaning m,
where ick is the ith participant effect modeling participantspecific deviation from the mean effect ck . For the complementary Model M 2b , W was specified to incorporate a joint effect mk of word meaning m and color degradation effect k, but no effect of word color c,
where imk is the ith participant effect modeling participantspecific deviation from the mean effect mk . M 2a and M 2b leave the invariance assumption intact, given that the W parameters for congruent and incongruent Stroop items of the same word color (M 2a ) or the same word meaning (M 2b ) are specified the same. Note that a "full" model in which W is a joint function of word color, word meaning, and color-degradation condition is not identified.
Model M 1 was compared with Models M 2a and M 2b via the deviance information criterion (DIC; Spiegelhalter et al., 2002; cf. Rouder et al., in press ). The DIC is a model-selection index that is a hierarchical modeling generalization of the Akaike information criterion (AIC). The DIC penalizes models according to their respective number of so-called effective parameters. The number of effective parameters is smaller than the number of specified parameters to the extent to which these are estimated as correlated in the hierarchical structure (for details, see Spiegelhalter et al., 2002) . The model with the smallest DIC is the model striking the best compromise between model fit and parsimony. Like AIC, DIC is formulated on a (2 times) log-likelihood scale, with rough guidelines stating that DIC differences larger than 10 imply strong evidence in favor of the model with the smaller DIC value (Burnham & Anderson, 2005) .
Results. We excluded-as anticipatory-trials with namingresponse latencies below 100 ms (0.65% of the trials). The accuracy data revealed a pronounced Stroop effect, with mean accuracy (SD) for incongruent, nonletter control, and congruent stimuli of, respectively, 66.4% (23.02), 89.1% (9.26), and 93% (7.21), F(1.13, 44.00) ϭ 68.27, p Ͻ .01, p 2 ϭ .64, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected degrees of freedom.
The model checks for Model M 1 were satisfactory, none of them indicating a significant violation of the model assumptions (i.e., the p values were larger than .05): as well as the color-naming parameters, collapsed across colors within each color-degradation condition, along with the 95% confidence intervals (CIs). As can be seen, color-naming performance decreases with increasing color degradation, as expected, and the Bayesian p value for the linear trend for degradation condition is smaller than .01. There is also evidence for a violation of the invariance assumption with W I Ͼ W E , as surmised, with a Bayesian p value smaller than .01, 95% CI [.29, .63], for the difference
One advantage of hierarchical modeling is the possibility of assessing correlations between processes without incurring the biases involved in computing Pearson correlation coefficients between individual parameter estimates (Jacoby & Shrout, 1997) . For example, the correlation across participants between W I and C (with C collapsed across color-degradation conditions) is estimated to be -.29, 95% CI [-.70, .36] ; the correlation between W E and C is estimated to be -.92, 95% CI [-.97, -.78] . The latter correlation suggests that participants who successfully suppress incongruent word meaning are the ones who perform well in color naming. Note that the evidence for correlations implies that there is heterogeneity related to participants. We report analogous correlational analyses for all analyses of Model M 1 in the different content domains investigated in this manuscript in the online supplemental materials. In each case, there was evidence for significant correlations. 5 Following an anonymous reviewer's request, we also analyzed the data in a more traditional manner, fitting a simple version of Model M 1 to each participant's data aggregated across items. We did this for all model-based analyses reported in this article. All of these analyses also adduced significant evidence for a violation of the invariance assumption for each of the three applications under scrutiny here. Details are reported in the online supplemental materials. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
In Tables 2 and 3 of the online supplemental materials, W parameters are shown for all 16 Stroop stimuli, as well as C parameters as a function of word color and degradation condition. As can be seen, there is also considerable heterogeneity related to item factors.
Importantly, Models M 2a and M 2b attained DIC values larger than that of M 1 by amounts of 82.66 and 225.45, respectively, so that M 1 received the strongest support relative to the two extended process-dissociation models with invariance assumption intact.
Discussion. Taken together, an extended Model M 1 that permits a test of the invariance assumption revealed evidence for a violation of the assumption with W I Ͼ W E . Model M 1 rests, however, on Lindsay and Jacoby's (1994) assumption that color degradation leaves the word-reading process unaffected. The auxiliary assumption received support in the present data in that Model M 1 provided a reasonable fit to the data. Furthermore, the DIC values provided additional support for M 1 relative to two alternative hierarchical process-dissociation models-M 2a and M 2b -that impose the invariance assumption but permit a violation of the auxiliary assumption. M 2a and M 2b are otherwise as similar as possible to M 1 , so that the model-selection exercise provides more focused support for the auxiliary assumption than the overall goodness of fit level of M 1 , according to the rationale explained in the Testing the Invariance Hypothesis: Overview section.
Nevertheless, we felt it prudent to run an additional test of the auxiliary assumption that does not rely on complex modeling. Specifically, it may be the case that the legibility of words differs as a function of degradation condition in violation of the auxiliary assumption. Study 2 examines the effects of color degradation on word reading.
Study 2
Study 2 employed the same materials and procedures as Study 1 with few exceptions. The participants' task was to read the word out loud as fast and as accurately as possible. The question was whether color degradation would exert an effect on word reading.
Method. Procedures and materials were the same as in Study 1, with the following exceptions. Participants were to read the word aloud as fast as possible for word stimuli, and to say "percent" in reaction to the nonletter control stimuli. To provoke a medium amount of errors, the response deadline was shortened to 500 ms.
There were 40 participants, most of them students from the University of Freiburg with different majors. Mean age was 24.4 years (SD ϭ 5.56; 33 female). One participant was excluded from the analyses because he almost never responded correctly.
Results. Trials with response latencies below 100 ms were excluded as anticipatory (1.11% of the trials). Mean accuracy values for the word stimuli were submitted to an analysis of variance with within-participant factors Color Degradation and Congruency. There was no evidence for an effect of congruency on word reading, F Ͻ 1. More importantly, there was no evidence for an effect of color degradation (F Ͻ 1), nor for an interaction of the two factors, F(1.57, 33.09) ϭ 1.12, p ϭ .32, p 2 ϭ .03, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected degrees of freedom. In fact, the Bayes factor for the full analysis of variance model with these factors against the model without main effect and interaction for color degradation was 116 in favor of the latter model (Morey & Rouder, 2014; Rouder, Morey, Speckman, & Province, 2012) . Mean accuracy was 87.49% (SD ϭ 10.10).
Discussion of the Stroop-Task Results (Studies 1 and 2)
The purpose of Model M 1 is to provide separate estimates of word-reading Parameter W for congruent and incongruent Stroop items. Parameter W for word-reading processes was W E ϭ .16 for the incongruent Stroop items and increased significantly to W I ϭ .64 for the congruent items. The analyses rest on Lindsay and Jacoby's (1994) assumption that color degradation does not affect word-reading processes-an assumption that found support in multiple tests in Studies 1 and 2.
The conclusion is that the original process-dissociation model with invariance assumption in force is untenable. If that model provided an adequate description of the data-generating processes, then one would simply have found the separate estimates of Parameter W not to differ by more than chance.
A conservative response to these results is to investigate whether the relaxed process-dissociation Model M 1 , with separate estimates W for congruent and incongruent Stroop stimuli, is an adequate model of the (accuracy data of the) Stroop task. Given the size of the discrepancy between W I and W E , it seems likely, however, that Parameters W I and W E of this model tap more than merely word reading. As already explained, item-specific modulation of Stroop interference (Jacoby et al., 2003) suggests that the association between Stroop stimulus and task-appropriate response becomes stronger for congruent relative to incongruent stimuli as an instance of contingency learning and repetition priming. Alternatively, participants might learn that inhibiting the word response can be relaxed for the frequently repeated congruent Stroop stimuli, but not for the other (incongruent) stimuli. We argued that both differential repetition priming and differential inhibition would affect the W parameters, causing differential W parameters for congruent and incongruent Stroop stimuli with W I Ͼ W E . This implies, in turn, that Parameter W is not only a measure of a word-reading process per se but also captures effects of repetition priming and/or inhibitory processes (Jacoby et al., 2003) . Studies manipulating contingencies (in particular, the proportion of congruent to incongruent stimuli) and inhibitory processes (e.g., via the availability of spare mental resources) could validate or disconfirm these ideas.
A less conservative response to these results is to assume that the processes that operate in the Stroop task are neither adequately captured by the original process-dissociation model nor by the relaxed Model M 1 . For example, there exist prominent alternative theories of the Stroop task (e.g., Blais et al., 2007; Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990; Melara & Algom, 2003) that are incommensurable with the fundamental process-dissociation idea that two processes of word reading and color naming operate relatively independently of each other (Trainham et al., 1997) . It is thus possible that the large difference between W I and W E in Model M 1 is a collateral expression of a more fundamental misspecification of the process-dissociation model for the Stroop task.
6 This possibility would gain credibility to the extent to which attempts to validate the relaxed Model M 1 as a substantive model of the Stroop task, such as the ones proposed in the previous paragraph, are not successful.
The Habit-Recollection Paradigm
The habit-recollection paradigm (Hay & Jacoby, 1996 ; see also Jacoby, Debner, & Hay, 2001; Tu & Hampton, 2013 ) is conceptually similar to the seminal two-list recognition-memory (Jacoby, 1991) but "avoids many problems, such as differences in base rate, and produces the same pattern of results as does the inclusionexclusion procedure [the two-list recognition-memory paradigm]" (Jacoby, 1998, p. 20) . The habit-recollection paradigm consists of a training phase and a study-test phase.
In a trial of the training phase, a word and a word fragment are presented (e.g., foot-s__e). The task is to complete the word fragment with a semantically related word for which two possibilities exist (sole and shoe), only one of which is "correct" in each trial as participants learn via trial-wise feedback. Across repeated presentations, the likelihood with which either completion is correct can be manipulated, creating a response bias or habit for the more frequent completion. Following Hay and Jacoby (1996) , we will refer to the more frequent completion as the typical completion.
In a subsequent study-test phase, words of the training phase are shown along with completed fragments in study lists (e.g., footsole). Each study list is followed by a cued-recall test in which the studied items are shown with word fragments (e.g., foot-s__e) and the participants' task is to complete the word fragment with the studied completion. Hay and Jacoby (1996) assume that recall performance in the study-test phase is determined by two independent processesrecollection and habit. Recollection is the dominant process, suggesting the studied completion as response with probability R; habit suggests the typical completion with probability H. Items with typical completion in the study list constitute the inclusion condition; items with untypical completion constitute the exclusion condition. Taken together, the model equations are
There is, however, a sizable literature on the effect of expectancies on encoding and retrieval processes, covering also the case of expectancies learned "online," as in the habit-recollection paradigm, suggesting that unexpected material such as untypical completions in the study list will often enjoy a memory advantage (e.g., Graesser & Nakamura, 1982; Hastie, 1981; Sherman, Lee, Bessenoff, & Frost, 1998) . For example, Sherman et al. (1998) draw a distinction similar to the identity-similarity distinction of fuzzy-trace theory (Brainerd, Reyna, & Kneer, 1995; , arguing that a verbatim trace is encoded only for untypical items, supporting later recollection of these items, whereas only a gist trace is usually encoded for typical items that does not support discrimination between the two related completions for a given cue word. These theories thus suggest a violation of the invariance hypothesis in the opposite direction from the Stroop model, namely, that R E Ͼ R I .
Studies 3 and 4 examined the invariance assumption in the habit-recollection paradigm (Hay & Jacoby, 1996) . We varied the probability of a typical completion in three steps to create three levels of habit strength: For different stimulus words, the typical completion appeared in 57%, 71%, or 87% of training-phase trials and the untypical completion in the remainder of trials. According to Hay and Jacoby (1996) , the manipulation of habit strength affects habit (the nondominant process with Parameter H) and leaves recollection (the dominant process with Parameter R) unaffected.
Study 3 capitalizes on this manipulation for a test of the invariance assumption. It followed Hay and Jacoby's (1996) procedures relatively closely with two exceptions: (a) as with the Stroop studies, we again implemented three, rather than two, levels of the manipulation of the nondominant process to obtain additional degrees of freedom for the model checks, and (b) we used longer study and test lists to obtain more data from each participant and to limit the contribution of short-term memory and working memory processes to what is measured by the recollection parameter.
The purpose of Study 4 was to provide converging evidence for the results of Study 3 without relying on the auxiliary assumption introduced and endorsed by Hay and Jacoby (1996) that the manipulation of habit strength does not affect recollection. In Study 4, we implemented a test of the invariance assumption via extending the set of response options by a skip option as discussed earlier (see the Testing the Invariance Hypothesis: Overview section).
Study 3
Method. The procedures followed those of Hay and Jacoby (1996) relatively closely, with the exceptions just noted. One experimental session required between 80 and 90 min.
Materials. The materials were 24 quadruples of stimuli (see Table 4 of the online supplemental materials). Each quadruple consists of a stimulus word (e.g., FAMILIE [family]), a word fragment (e.g., _A_A), and two associated completions (e.g., MAMA [mum] , and PAPA [dad]). The 24 quadruples were selected on the basis of a pilot study in which 72 stimulus words were presented along with word fragments for completion. In this pilot study, participants were asked to complete each fragment by a word related to the stimulus word. The 46 participants in the pilot study did not participate in Studies 3 or 4 but stemmed from the same participant pool. Those stimulus words and word fragments were selected which provoked only two modal completions and few additional completions, and for which the two modal completions were generated about equally frequently.
Design. All randomizations were performed for each participant anew. The 24 quadruples were randomly divided into three sets of eight quadruples, which were used in the three habitstrength conditions. It was also randomly determined for each quadruple and participant which of the two completions would serve as the typical one, and hence which completion as the untypical one.
The training phase consisted of three blocks of 168 trials each. A trial presented a stimulus word and word fragment from one of the 24 quadruples. Each pair of stimulus word and word fragment was presented seven times per block. For the 57% condition, the typical completion was presented as "correct" response in four of these seven trials; for the 71% condition, in five out of seven trials; and for the 87% condition, in six out of seven trials. The untypical completion was the correct response in the remaining trials (out of This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
these seven trials). The order of trials was randomized for each block with the restriction that the same stimulus word was not presented more than three times in succession. The study-test phase consisted of 16 successive study-test lists. Each study list contained 21 stimulus words paired with one of its two completions. Each study list respected the training proportions of typical and untypical completions. Thus, there were seven stimulus words from the 57% habit-strength condition, four of which were shown with their typical completion; the seven stimulus words for the 71% condition were shown with typical completion for five of the stimulus words, and for the 87% condition, the typical completion was shown for six of the seven stimulus words from this condition. Each test list comprised all 24 pairs of stimulus words and word fragments; 21 of the stimulus words were part of the study list, and the remaining three were nonstudied items, one from each habit-strength condition. Their purpose was to assess the different habit strengths more directly- Hay and Jacoby (1996) refer to them as "guessing items." Which items were studied and which were guessing items were determined randomly for each study-test list, with the just-discussed restrictions.
Procedure. Words were presented in uppercase black letters on a white background in the center of the screen in a 36-pt Lucida Sans Demibold font. All responses were recorded by the experimenter.
In the training phase, pairs of stimulus words and word fragments were presented. Participants were instructed to guess the semantically related word that would complete the fragment and to respond aloud. The stimulus word and word fragment were shown for 2 s, during which time participants were to respond. The stimulus word and correct completion were then presented for 1 s. The experimenter entered the participant's response via the computer keyboard. After a 500-ms intertrial interval, the next pair of stimulus word and word fragment was presented.
Participants were informed that each stimulus word would be paired with two completion words in each block of the training phase. Following Hay and Jacoby (1996, p. 689) , participants were instructed to try to predict the completion word that would appear as correct on each particular trial. Furthermore, they were told that some completion words would appear more often than others and that they should pay attention to the answers the computer was presenting because doing so would help guide their responding. Participants were encouraged to make a response on every trial before the correct answer appeared on the screen.
Participants were permitted to take a break between blocks. Following training, the study-test phase was administered. The 21 word pairs of each study list were presented for 1 s each, with an intertrial interval of 500 ms. Participants were instructed to remember the word pairs for the following memory test. As in Hay and Jacoby (1996) , participants were to count backward in steps of three between study list and test list starting from a randomly drawn number between 30 and 100 for 6.5 s. This was followed by the presentation of the test list. The test was a cued-recall test presenting pairs of stimulus words and word fragments. Participants were instructed to complete fragments by recalling aloud the completion from the list just studied. They were told that they were to guess if they could not do so. Participants were informed of the fact that some pairs would be tested even though they did not appear in the previous study list. For the guessing items, participants were instructed to complete the fragment with the first word that came to mind. Word pairs were presented for 3 s, during which time participants were to respond. Following each test, the next pair of study-test lists was presented.
Participants. The 40 participants (mean age 24.15 years, SD ϭ 5.12; 27 female) were mostly University of Freiburg students with different majors. They received a monetary gratification of €10.50 (approximately $14.45) for participating or partial course credit.
Data analyses. The data analyses followed the procedures of Study 1. The 48 items (i.e., the 48 completions that could occur as response) were entered random factors, however. Because each completion appeared as a typical as well as an untypical completion across participants (as determined by random assignment for each participant anew), it was possible to estimate all model parameters with random factors for participants as well as for items. The model checks were again based on the T statistics. Because there were two kinds of random factors, one for items and one for participants, two separate variance-covariance matrices were estimated-one for the variances and covariances between the model parameters across participants, and one across items. Correspondingly, there were two T B statistics, with T B1 assessing, as before, whether the model adequately predicts the dependencies between response frequencies across participants, and T B2 assessing the fit to the observed dependencies across items (see Model checks section of the online supplemental materials for details).
Results. We analyzed the data from the study-test phase. Trials with responses other than the two trained completions or without response within the response window were discarded (0.59% of trials). Leaving out the guessing items, participants responded with the studied completion in 78.60% of the cases (SD ϭ 8.84). They were sensitive to the habit-strength manipulation, with the percentages of typical completions for guessing items being (SD in parentheses) 57.48% (14.69), 73.15% (9.64), and 83.73% (13.62) for, respectively, the habit-strength conditions with 57%, 71%, and 87% typical completions, F(1.61, 62.75) ϭ 47.25, p Ͻ .01, p 2 ϭ .55, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected degrees of freedom.
Following Hay and Jacoby (1996) , we left out the guessing items for the model-based analyses. As for Study 1, Model M 1 is the model that permits a violation of the invariance assumption, with R I potentially unequal to R E . M 1 uses the auxiliary assumption endorsed by Hay and Jacoby that habit strength does not affect recollection. The model checks for Model M 1 were satisfactory, with none of them indicating a significant violation of the model assumptions: Figure 2 shows the recollection Parameter R for studied typical completions (inclusion condition) and studied untypical completions (exclusion condition), and the habit parameters (H) for each habit-strength condition, along with the 95% CIs. As can be seen, This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
the habit parameters increase with increasing habit strength, as expected, and the Bayesian p value for the linear trend of habit strength is smaller than .01. There is also evidence for a violation of the invariance assumption with R I Ͻ R E , as surmised, with a p value smaller than .01, 95% CI [.40, .57], for the difference R E -R I . Like in Study 1, we estimated an alternative model-a hierarchical process-dissociation Model M 2 with invariance assumption in force, but permitting a violation of the auxiliary assumption (i.e., the recollection parameters were allowed to differ as a function of habit strength). M 2 was specified like M 1 in all other respects. Its DIC value exceeded that of M 1 by an amount of 96.41, indicating a preference for M 1 .
Unlike for the nonletter control stimuli in the Stroop task, the "neutral" guessing items seem sufficiently similar to the study-list items to warrant including them into the model-based analyses. According to Jacoby (1996, p. 1325) , "participants' responses to guessing items were expected to provide a relatively pure measure of habit against which we could compare estimates of habit derived from congruent [typical] and incongruent [untypical] test conditions." Accepting this assumption allows one to estimate a model without the invariance assumption and without the auxiliary assumption, because including the responses to the guessing items identifies the habit (H) parameters under this assumption. It is therefore possible to estimate separate R parameters for the inclusion and exclusion conditions in each habit-strength condition.
The model checks for this extended hierarchical Model M 3 were satisfactory, none of them indicating a significant violation of the model assumptions: Figure 3 shows the recollection Parameter R for studied typical completions (inclusion condition) and studied untypical completions (exclusion condition) in each habit-strength condition, as well as the habit (H) parameters for each habit-strength condition, along with the 95% CIs.
As before, the habit parameters increase with increasing habitstrength condition, as expected, and the Bayesian p value for the linear trend for habit-strength condition is smaller than .01. There is also evidence for a violation of the invariance assumption with R I Ͻ R E as surmised, with a p value smaller than .01, 95% CI [.25, .48], for the difference R E -R I , when R parameters are collapsed across habit-strength condition. The advantage for items with studied untypical completion relative to items with studied typical completion appears to increase with increasing habit strength, but the invariance assumption is found to be violated Discussion. The results of Study 3 were again relatively clear. A relaxed process-dissociation Model M 1 that permits a test of the invariance assumption revealed evidence for a violation of the assumption with R I Ͻ R E . This suggests that unexpected (untypical) items enjoy a recollection advantage in line with the previously cited theories of expectancy effects in memory.
Model M 1 rests, however, on Hay and Jacoby's (1996) assumption that the habit-strength manipulation leaves recollection unaffected, although it permits recollection to differ between items with studied typical and untypical completions. The auxiliary This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
assumption received support in the present data in that Model M 1 achieved a reasonable fit to the data. Furthermore, the DIC values provided additional support for M 1 relative to an alternative hierarchical process-dissociation Model M 2 that imposes the invariance assumption but permits a violation of the auxiliary assumption. In addition, a third model, M 3 , included the responses to the guessing items. For Model M 3 , the auxiliary assumption pertaining to the habit-strength manipulation is not needed. Instead, an alternative auxiliary assumption is required, namely, Hay and Jacoby's (1996) assumption that responses to guessing items provide a relatively pure estimate of habit, as captured by Parameter H. Model M 3 is in fact basically a standard, although hierarchically extended, one-high-threshold model of item memory (Blackwell, 1963) , with the unstudied guessing items as new items. The analyses based on Model M 3 converge with the results and interpretations suggested by Model M 1 , thereby raising one's confidence in the conclusion that the invariance assumption is violated. The alternative would be that both auxiliary assumptions-the one regarding the habit-strength manipulation and the one regarding the guessing items-are independently violated in directions that would, in each case independently, cause spurious evidence for a substantial violation of the invariance assumption with R I Ͻ R E , without, at the same time, leading to model misfit.
Nevertheless, the new auxiliary assumption built into one-highthreshold models-that guessing items provide relatively pure estimates of Parameter H-is problematic. For example, people are regularly able to detect, with great confidence, that unstudied items are indeed new, at least for a proportion of the unstudied items. This process is captured, for example, by the Parameter D N of the two-high-threshold model (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) for the "detect new" threshold. If a "detect new" process operates in the present data, it might contribute to shaping responses to the guessing items, and it would be a process unaccounted for by M 3 . It should also be acknowledged that Hay and Jacoby (1996) never formally included the data from the guessing items in their modelbased analyses of the habit-recollection paradigm.
Study 4 implemented yet another means to enlarge the database to enable one to estimate separate R parameters for inclusion and exclusion conditions in each habit-strength condition. Study 4 does not rely on the auxiliary assumption of Model M 1 of Study 3 (i.e., that manipulating habit strength leaves recollection unaffected), nor does it rely on guessing items.
Study 4
Study 4 followed Study 3 closely, with the major difference that participants were allowed to skip the response if they did not remember the studied completion. To motivate and regulate the use of the skip option, participants received 3 Euro cents in the study-test phase for each correctly completed fragment, and they lost 3 cents for each wrongly completed or uncompleted fragment for items in the study list. If they chose the skip option, however, they neither gained nor lost cents.
Method. Study 4 followed the procedures of Study 3 unless otherwise mentioned.
Procedures. Participants were told that they could earn money in addition to a fixed amount of €6.50 (approximately $8.94) by fast and correct responses. They read that they would earn (lose) 3 cents for each correct and timely (incorrect or too late) completion of studied items. Use of the skip option (saying out loud "skip") would, however, lead to neither gain nor loss of money. They were also told that they were to use the skip option for the guessing items, and that they were not to use the skip option more than 6 times per test list. Participants were shown the running total of cents earned after every one fourth of the 16 study-test lists.
Participants. There were 41 participants, one of whom had already taken part in the pilot study mentioned in the Method section of Study 3, and who should therefore not have participated according to an explicit exclusion criterion set up for Studies 3 and 4. The participant was excluded from the analyses. The 40 remaining participants (mean age 22.58 years, SD ϭ 3.27; 23 female) were mostly University of Freiburg students with different majors. They received a monetary gratification of €6.50 (approximately $8.94) and a performance-contingent additional amount of up to €10.08 (approximately $13.87) for participating.
Data analyses. The additional degrees of freedom provided by the skip option allowed us to fit a model with separate R parameters for each habit-strength condition and inclusion-exclusion condition, leaving out the guessing items. The skip option is modeled by an additional Parameter S (see Figure 4) . The skip response is chosen with probability S, given the absence of recollection (1 -R), whereas with probability 1 -S, the completion is governed by Parameter H, as before (leading to the typical completion with probability H and to the untypical completion with probability 1 -H). Like H, S was allowed to vary as a function of habit-strength condition. The resulting model is identified (Sing- This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
mann et al., 2013). As in Study 3, we included item and participant random effects for each model parameter.
Results. Trials from the study-test phase were analyzed. Trials with responses other than the two trained completions or without response were discarded (0.52% of trials). Leaving out the guessing items, participants used the skip option in 8.74% of the cases (SD ϭ 5.23) and responded with the studied completion in 84.85% of the remaining cases (SD ϭ 7.09). They were sensitive to the habit-strength manipulation, the percentages of typical completions for guessing items being (SD in Figure 5 shows the recollection Parameter R for studied typical completions (inclusion condition) and studied untypical completions (exclusion condition) in each habit-strength condition, the habit parameters (H) and the skip parameters (S) for each habitstrength condition, along with the 95% CIs. As can be seen, the habit parameters increase with increasing habit-strength condition, as expected, and the Bayesian p value for the linear trend for habit-strength condition is smaller than .01. There is also evidence for a violation of the invariance assumption with R I Ͻ R E , as surmised, with a p value smaller than .01, 95% CI [.05, .37], for the difference R E -R I , when parameters are collapsed across habitstrength condition. This advantage for items with studied untypical completion relative to items with studied typical completion increases with increasing habit strength, and in separate tests per habit-strength condition, there is significant evidence for a violation of the invariance assumption for habit-strength condition 87%, Bayesian p Ͻ .01, 95% CI [.04, .66], for the difference R E -R I .
Discussion of the Habit-Recollection Paradigm Results (Studies 3 and 4)
Study 4 provided another test of the invariance assumption in the habit-recollection paradigm. This test is neither predicated on the auxiliary assumption that the manipulation of habit strength leaves recollection invariant, nor on the assumption that the responses to the guessing items reflect habit (H) relatively directly. Of course, the model used in Study 4 introduces new auxiliary assumptions concerning how skip responses are modeled (see Figure 4 ), but these assumptions are qualitatively different from, and independent of, the auxiliary assumptions for the model-based analyses of Study 3. Nevertheless, there was again significant evidence for a violation of the invariance hypothesis: The main effects of typicality collapsed across habit-strength conditions as well as the simple effect for habit-strength condition 87% were both significant.
Taken together with the results from Study 3, the model-based analyses converge on the conclusion that untypical items enjoy a memory advantage relative to typical items, and they suggest that this memory advantage increases with increasing habit strength. For Study 3, it is also possible to fit an unequal-variance-signaldetection model (MacMillan & Creelman, 2005) , which again produces significant evidence for better memory of the untypical studied items (see Study 3 section of the online supplemental materials). In short, whatever the set of model assumptions (i.e., those of the relaxed process-dissociation Model M 1 , the one-highthreshold Model M 3 , the model with skip option, or the unequalvariance-signal-detection model) invoked, there is evidence for a mnemonic advantage for the untypical studied items in the present paradigm.
This conclusion thus appears not to hinge on the particular set of auxiliary assumptions that is capitalized upon to disentangle parameters for item memory in inclusion and exclusion conditions. The advantage for untypical items is in line with prominent theories for the effect of expectancies on memory processes. For example, Sherman et al. (1998) draw on a distinction between conceptual and perceptual memory traces that is reminiscent of the identity-similarity distinction drawn by fuzzy-trace theory . In this view, only a gist trace is usually encoded for typical completions. The gist trace alone does not allow one to distinguish between the two related completions at test, whereas a verbatim trace is encoded for untypical completions permitting one to recollect the appropriate completion at test.
The Weapon Task
In a trial of the weapon task, participants see a Black or White face as prime followed by a picture of a tool or a weapon as target,
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and the task is to decide, as fast and accurately as possible, whether the target is a tool or a weapon. A reliable finding in the sizable literature on this task reviewed, for example, by Payne and Bishara (2009) , is that the decision is facilitated, occurs faster, and is more accurate, if a Black face precedes a weapon or a White face precedes a tool than if a Black face precedes a tool or a White face precedes a weapon (Payne, 2001 ).
In the process-dissociation model for this task (Payne, 2001 ), responses in the weapon task are determined by two independent processes, (controlled) discrimination and response bias. Discrimination of the target category is the dominant process, sometimes labeled "control" in this literature. Discrimination suggests the correct category as response with probability C. Response bias suggests the response "weapon" rather than "tool" with probability A when discrimination fails. The process responsible for response bias is the nondominant process. Both Parameters C and A may vary as a function of the prime race. That is, there are separate values C B , C W and A B , A W for trials with a Black (B) and a White (W) face. Trials with a Black face and weapon target constitute inclusion conditions; trials with a Black face and tool target constitute exclusion conditions. A second pair of inclusion and exclusion conditions is implemented by the trials with the White face. These conditions are grouped according to kind of prime face in the model equations:
In process-dissociation analyses of data from the weapon task, racial bias in the task is mapped as A B Ͼ A W . The interpretation is that primes automatically elicit response biases that are shaped by prime race, with Black primes associated with weapons more strongly than White primes. Accordingly, A B -A W is considered a measure of racial bias in the task.
As pointed out by Payne, Shimizu, and Jacoby (2005) and Klauer and Voss (2008) , an alternative possibility is, however, that prime race colors the perception and early interpretation of bits of information gleaned from the target picture. For example, a metal tube might receive a first, tentative interpretation as the barrel of a gun when presented with a Black prime, and as the shaft of a screwdriver when presented with a White prime. In terms of the model parameters, this implies that prime race should modulate target discrimination in the form of an interaction of prime race and target category (Klauer & Voss, 2008; Payne et al., 2005; Wentura & Degner, 2010) , so that C B is larger in weapon (w) trials than in tool (t) trials, C Bw Ͼ C Bt , and C W is larger in tool trials than in weapon trials, C Wt Ͼ C Ww , implying violations of the invariance hypothesis. Note that distinguishing between only C B and C W as a function of prime race, as in the conventional parameterization, cannot accommodate an interaction of prime race and target category, and hence is not sufficient for accounting for racial bias in the data. Figure 6 shows how a violation of the invariance hypothesis of this shape (C Bw Ͼ C Bt and C Wt Ͼ C Ww ) maps on the accuracy data in the weapon task, and how such data, in turn, map on the parameters of the process-dissociation model. This illustrates that both possibilities-racial bias mediated via response biases and racial bias mediated via the discrimination process-account for the observable data equally well. A means to test the invariance assumption would therefore open a route to distinguishing between the two rival theoretical accounts discussed in this literature.
Studies 5 and 6 examined the invariance assumption for the process-dissociation model of the weapon task. In Study 5, we implemented a payoff manipulation rewarding fast and accurate "weapon" and "tool" responses differentially as a means to manipulate response bias while keeping discrimination constant. The auxiliary assumption required in Study 5 is that the payoff manipulation affects only response bias but not discrimination. This would be the expectation based on the results obtained in recognition memory, for perceptual discrimination tasks (MacMillan & Creelman, 2005) , and for payoff manipulations in reaction-time tasks (Luce, 1986 ), but it is not self-evident that the auxiliary assumption holds for the weapon task. Study 6 therefore provided a more direct, experimental test of the assumption that does not rely on complex modeling assumptions.
Study 5
Method. Fast and accurate weapon and tool responses were rewarded to different degrees. The payoff manipulation had three levels labeled high tool payoff, balanced payoff, and high weapon payoff. A session of the experiment required approximately 25 min. Procedures followed closely Payne's (2001) Experiment 2. Figure 6 . A crossover interaction in the discrimination parameters with racial bias in terms of the A parameters equal to zero (left half) leads to racial bias in the predicted error rates (middle panel), which is mapped on racial bias in terms of the A parameters in the conventional process dissociation analysis (right panel). PD ϭ process dissociation. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Materials. Targets were five pictures of hand tools and five pictures of weapons, each with a size of 126 ϫ 106 pixels presented on a 48.3-cm CRT screen with a resolution of 1024 ϫ 768 pixels and a seating distance of approximately 60 cm. The target pictures were based on pictures made available by Payne (n.d.), but we replaced one picture of a borer with a screw wrench, and two pictures of pistols with knives. Primes were 12 pictures of White male faces and 12 pictures of Black male faces. Prime pictures were selected from Payne's prime pictures and from the Radboud Faces database (Langner et al., 2010) , using faces with neutral facial expressions. All prime pictures were edited so that they had a size of 200 ϫ 300 pixels and showed only the face from about the chin to the hairline, with hardly any background or clothes visible. Electronic versions of our prime and target pictures can be obtained from the authors. We also used Payne's (n.d.) visual mask (126 ϫ 106 pixels).
Procedures. In each trial, two pictures-a prime picture and a target picture-were presented in the center of the screen. The prime picture was always a Black or White face, and it remained on screen for 300 ms. It was then followed by the target picture, which was always a weapon or a tool. After the target was presented for 100 ms, it was replaced by the visual mask. If no response occurred within 550 ms of target onset, a series of red "X"s appeared on screen for 1,000 ms, signaling that the response was too late. All responses occurring within 550 ms after target onset were registered. The intertrial interval was 500 ms.
Instructions followed Payne (2001, Experiment 2). In particular, participants were told that the face would signal that the target picture was about to be presented. Participants were asked to indicate as fast and accurately as possible whether the target image showed a weapon or a tool. They were instructed to respond within 550 ms. Responses that occurred after the 550-ms deadline were coded as missing.
Participants first worked through a practice block of 120 trials without payoff. This was followed by three blocks of 240 trials each (crossing the 24 primes with the 10 targets) that differed in the payoff schedule. Prior to each experimental block, participants were instructed that they could earn points by timely and correct responses. For a block with high tool payoff, they were told that they would earn 3 points and 1 point for tool and weapon targets, respectively, per correct response prior to the response deadline; for a block with balanced payoff, 2 and 2 points; and for a block with high weapon payoff, 1 point and 3 points. Participants were told that the points would later be converted into Euro cents, with 3 points converted into 2 Euro cents, so that they could earn a maximum of €4.80 (approximately $6.72). At the bottom of the screen, they saw running totals of the points earned in the current block in response to (a) tool targets, (b) weapon targets, and (c) both kinds of targets. End-of-block feedback comprised mean response latency and mean error rate for the just-finished block as well as the grand total of points earned up to this point in the course of the experiment. Participants were allowed to rest between blocks.
Participants. This study included a total of 168 participants. Most of them were students from the University of Freiburg with different majors. Mean age was 23.6 years (SD ϭ 4.96; 96 female). Participants were randomly assigned to 12 counterbalancing conditions, defined by the order in which the three payoff conditions were administered (six possible orders), crossed with whether weapons and tools were mapped on the left and right response key, respectively, or vice versa, so that there were 14 participants in each counterbalancing condition.
Six participants were excluded from further analyses as extreme outliers according to Tukey's criterion (Clark-Carter, 2004, Chapter 9) , with more than 17.2% of missing responses in the sample's distribution of percentage missing responses (M ϭ 5.2%, SD ϭ 9.1).
Data analyses. Prime type (Black vs. White) and target (there were only 10 targets) were entered as fixed effects; primes (N ϭ 24) and participants were entered as random effects. For all models considered, response bias parameters (A) were a joint function of prime type and payoff condition, with random effects for primes and participants modulating the joint effect of prime type and payoff condition. It was not possible to let the response-bias parameters vary as a function of targets or target type (weapon vs. tool) because of identifiability limitations.
For Model M 1 , discrimination parameters were a joint function of prime type and target, with random effects for primes and participants added to the joint effect of prime type and target. Model M 1 thereby admitted a violation of the invariance hypotheses: For example, it is possible that discrimination of a weapon target preceded by a Black face differs from discrimination of that target when it is preceded by a White face. But the model rests on the auxiliary assumption that discrimination is not a function of payoff condition.
Models M 2a and M 2b were hierarchical process-dissociation models that enforce the invariance assumption but not the auxiliary assumption. In all other respects, they are specified like Model M 1 . Specifically, discrimination parameters in M 2a were a joint function of prime type and payoff condition, as per Payne's (2001) original PD model (extended by separate random effects for primes and participants added to the joint effect of prime type and payoff condition). Discrimination parameters in the complementary process-dissociation Model M 2b were a joint function of target and payoff condition (with separate random effects for participants added to the joint effect of target and payoff condition). For identifiability reasons, it was not possible to estimate a "full" model with discrimination being a joint function of prime, target, and payoff condition.
Results. An average of 3.7% (SD ϭ 3.1) of the responses did not occur before the response deadline or occurred earlier than 100 ms after target onset. These responses were excluded from further analyses.
There was evidence for racial bias, with more accurate responses in stereotype-congruent (Black-weapon; White-tool) than in stereotype-incongruent (Black-tool; White-weapon) trials (see Figure 7 , left half). Racial bias was significant in each payoff condition tested separately (smallest t[161] ϭ 4.09, smallest effect size d ϭ 0.32, largest p Ͻ .01). Furthermore, an analysis of variance of the accuracy data with the within-participants factors Kind of Target (weapon vs. tool) and Payoff Condition (high tool, balanced, high weapon) revealed an interaction, F(1.42, 228.42) ϭ 41.10, p Ͻ .01, p 2 ϭ .20, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected degrees of freedom, of the form consistent with response bias favoring the more highly rewarded response (see Figure 7 , right half).
The model checks for Model M 1 were satisfactory, except for the fit to the variances and covariances of the response frequencies This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
of the different response categories computed across participants, T B1 : The classical goodness-of-fit statistic G 2 (Batchelder & Riefer, 1999) for Model M 1 , computed for each participant (without random factor for primes), revealed that three participants significantly departed from the model in their response behavior (with Bonferroni-Holm correction for multiple testing and a significance level ␣ of .05; Holm, 1979) . Excluding these three participants led to nonsignificant results for all of the model-check statistics (smallest p ϭ .08), and did not otherwise change any of the results reported next, all of which include the data from these three participants. Figure 8 shows the discrimination Parameter C as a function of type of trial (Black-weapon, White-tool ϭ inclusion conditions; Black-tool, White-weapon ϭ exclusion conditions) and the response-bias Parameter A as a function of payoff condition, along with the 95% CIs.
7 As can be seen, the A parameters for response bias favoring weapon responses increase as payoff for weapons increases, as expected, and the Bayesian p value for the linear trend for payoff is smaller than .01. There was, however, no evidence for the assumption that response bias for weapons is higher in trials with Black primes than with White primes, A B Ͼ A W , Bayesian p ϭ .73, and 95% CI for A B -A W of [Ϫ0.12, 0.06] (see Table 6 of the online supplemental materials for the parameter estimates). Instead, there is evidence for a violation of the invariance assumption, with C larger in the inclusion than in the exclusion conditions and a p value smaller than .01 for the interaction of Prime Race and Type of Target in the expected direction, C I Ͼ C E (see Figure 8 , cf. also Figure 6 ). The 95% CI for the difference C I -C E was [.02, .16 ].
In Table 5 of the online supplemental materials, C parameters are shown for all 10 targets and each prime race, and for A parameters as a function of prime race and payoff condition. As can be seen, there is considerable heterogeneity in the C parameters related to item factors.
Moreover, the DIC value of Model M 2a exceeded that of Model M 1 by 3079.88, and the DIC value of Model M 1 exceeded that of Model M 2b by 220.70. Thus, the hierarchical process-dissociation model, M 2b , performs better than M 1 . Model M 1 , in turn, performs much better than Model M 2a , the original process dissociation model proposed by Payne (2001) , extended by random factors for participants and primes.
Discussion. Study 5 provided a test of the invariance assumption for the weapon task and again found evidence for a violation of the assumption. These results are again predicated on an auxiliary assumption-here, on the assumption that the payoff manipulation affects only response bias and leaves discrimination untouched. Again, this is the expectation that can be derived from the literature on payoff manipulations. Along with the other model assumptions, the auxiliary assumption is consistent with the data in the sense that the model checks were satisfactory after three misfitting individuals were taken out of the analyses. Yet the DIC-based comparison of models with and without the auxiliary assumption yielded an ambiguous outcome: Model M 1 , which makes the auxiliary assumption, was supported in a comparison with a relatively direct hierarchical extension of Payne's (2001) original process-dissociation model, but lost in a second comparison with another model that does not make the auxiliary assumption. Study 6 implements an independent, more direct experimental test of the auxiliary assumption that does not rest on complex model-based analyses.
Study 6
In Study 6, participants discriminated between four categoriesweapons, tools, cutlery (excluding knives), and pens-each represented by five pictures. The four categories were assigned to the two response keys so that two of the categories were mapped on the left key and the remaining two on the right key. Participants were thus to press the left key if a stimulus from one of the two categories assigned to that key was presented, and the right key if a stimulus from one of the two categories assigned to the right key was shown.
As in Study 5, timely and correct responses to each category were rewarded by points that were later converted into Euro cents. Two of the categories were assigned 2 points per correct and timely response, a third category 1 point, and the fourth category 3 points. In addition, the two categories with a 2-points payoff were mapped on different response keys. Thus, there is one re-7 Remember that, C Bw refers to the C parameters for trials with Black prime collapsed across the five weapon (w) targets, C Bt collapses across the five tool (t) targets, and so on. C I additionally collapses across the two inclusion conditions (Bw and Wt), and C E across the two exclusion conditions (Bt and Ww). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
sponse key, let us call it "A," that has to be pressed for the least rewarded target category (1A), namely, the one with a 1-point payoff, and that has to be pressed for one of the two categories with a 2-points payoff (2A). The other response key, let us call it "B," has to be pressed for the most rewarded target category (3B), namely, the one with a 3-points payoff, and has to be pressed for the other of the two categories with a 2-points payoff (2B). The interaction of kind of target and payoff in the accuracy data observed in Study 5 (see Figure 7 , right half) is readily explained by response bias favoring weapons to the extent to which correct and timely weapon responses are rewarded. To account for the interaction in terms of effects of payoff on discrimination, discrimination of a given target category would have to increase as a function of payoff for correct and timely responses to stimuli of that category. If it does, accuracy should differ between the four present conditions as follows: 1A Ͻ 2A ϭ 2B Ͻ 3B. If, on the other hand, response bias increases as a function of payoff, we expect response bias to favor categories mapped on the overall more highly rewarded Response B, and hence accuracy should follow the following pattern: 1A ϭ 2A Ͻ 2B ϭ 3B.
The two possibilities-payoff affects discrimination versus payoff affects response bias-thus lead to two contrastive pairs of independent hypotheses: (a) if payoff affects discrimination, then accuracy should be equal in Conditions 2A and 2B, and in contrast, if payoff affects response bias, then accuracy should be higher in Condition 2B than in 2A; and (b) if payoff affects discrimination, then accuracy should be higher in Condition 2A than in Condition 1A, and higher in Condition 3B than in Condition 2B, and in contrast, if payoff affects response bias, then there should be little difference between Conditions 2A and 1A and between Conditions 3B and 2B. 8 Method. Participants worked through two blocks of 240 experimental trials, preceded by a block of 120 practice trials, so that accuracy data are based on 120 trials per category, as in Study 5. Presentation and timing parameters were exactly as in Study 5. For example, each target stimulus was preceded by a prime stimulus, although the interest was not in priming effects in the control experiment. Payoff points were converted into Euro cents at the end of the experiment so that participants could earn a maximum of €4.80 (approximately $6.60) for participating. Mapping of target categories (weapon, tool, cutlery, pen) to conditions (1A, 2A, 2B, 3B; 24 possible orders) and mapping of A and B to response key (right key, left key) was counterbalanced across participants, creating 48 conditions for counterbalancing.
Because the payoff regime was more complicated than that employed in Study 5, participants (N ϭ 53, mostly students from the University of Freiburg with different majors) were asked to enter the point assignments for each target category from memory after reading the payoff instructions. If a participant made an error in recalling the just-instructed payoff schedule, the instructions were presented again, followed by another test of memory for the payoff schedule. After a maximum of three instruction-test loops, the experiment went on with the practice and experimental trials, but we had decided a priori to exclude participants from the analyses who still made errors in the third instruction-test loop.
After 48 participants had been tested, one participant was excluded on this basis, and four more participants were excluded according to Tukey's criterion as extreme outliers, with more than 26.2% of missing responses in the sample's distribution of percentage missing responses (M ϭ 8.1%, SD ϭ 10.5). These five participants were replaced by new participants so that each of the 48 counterbalancing conditions was administered to exactly one participant. The 48 participants retained for analysis had a mean age of 22.92 years (SD ϭ 4.45), and 28 were female.
Results and discussion. As in Study 5, responses that did not occur prior to the response deadline or earlier than 100 ms after target onset (5.5%, SD ϭ 3.8) were coded as missing. Mean percent correct values in Conditions 1A, 2A, 2B, and 3B were, respectively, 78.8%, 76.4%, 79.8%, and 81.8% (SDs were, respectively, 12.8, 12.7, 12.8, and 10.6 ).
An analysis of variance with percent accuracy as dependent variable and condition (1A, 2A, 2B, and 3B) as within-participants factor found a significant main effect of condition, F(2.92, 137.08) ϭ 3.35, p ϭ .02, p 2 ϭ .07, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected degrees of freedom. Two a priori contrasts tested the two pairs of hypotheses: (a) the first contrast compares Conditions 2A and 2B; and (b) the second contrast compares 1A and 2A, as well as 2B and 3B, with weights (Ϫ1,1,Ϫ1,1) for conditions (1A, 2A, 2B, 3B). If payoff affects response bias, but not discrimination, the first contrast should be significant (because Response B is associated with overall higher payoff than Response A), but not the second (because the contrast weights of the second contrast do not discriminate between Responses A and B); if payoff affects discrimination of a category, but not response bias, the second, but not the first, contrast should be significant (because payoff is constant for the two categories compared in the first contrast). The first contrast was indeed significant, F(1, 47) ϭ 4.54, p ϭ .04, p 2 ϭ .09, the second was not, F Ͻ 1, p 2 ϭ .001. 8 The two possibilities are not mutually exclusive. If both are true, the expected pattern is 1A Ͻ 2A Ͻ 2B Ͻ 3B. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
As an exploratory analysis, we computed pairwise two-tailed t tests between the four conditions. The crucial comparison between 2A and 2B was significant, t(47) ϭ Ϫ2.13, p ϭ .04, d ϭ 0.31, as well as the one between 2A and 3B, t(47) ϭ Ϫ3.17, p ϭ .003, d ϭ 0.46. There was a trend for a significant t value for comparing 1A and 3B, t(47) ϭ Ϫ1.62, p ϭ .11, d ϭ 0.23, in the direction expected, if response bias favors responses with potentially high payoff. The comparison of 1A and 2A was not significant, t(47) ϭ 1.49, p ϭ .14, d ϭ 0.21, and it pointed in a direction that is expected under neither of the two possibilities contrasted here. The remaining two t values were smaller in absolute value than 1.091.
Taken together, the auxiliary assumption that the payoff manipulation affects response bias and leaves discrimination unaffected can be maintained. There was significant evidence for the crucial prediction, 2A Ͻ 2B, whereas none of the predictions (1A Ͻ 2A, 2B Ͻ 3B) following from the alternative possibility received support.
Discussion of the Weapon Task Results (Studies 5 and 6)
For the weapon task, a test for the invariance assumption opens up an empirical route to addressing an unresolved debate in the literature on the weapon task. The question is whether racial bias in the task reflects effects of race on response bias or on discrimination (Klauer & Voss, 2008; Payne et al., 2005; Wentura & Degner, 2010) . Enforcing the invariance assumption-as the conventional process-dissociation model of the weapon task doesprevents racial bias in the data from being mapped on a stereotypecongruency effect of race on discrimination of this kind. In fact, much of the sizable literature on the weapon task has embraced the a priori assumption that racial bias in weapon-task data reflects an effect of race on response bias. Once the invariance assumption is relaxed, racial bias in the data is a priori not constrained to map on only an effect of race on response bias; it can also map on an effect of race on discrimination processes. Study 5 implemented these conditions, and it turns out that racial bias in the data is mapped on a stereotype-congruency effect in discrimination, whereas there is no evidence for the traditional idea that Black faces engender response bias favoring the weapon response more strongly than White faces.
Study 6 provided a more direct experimental test of the auxiliary assumption of Study 5 that the payoff manipulation affects response bias and leaves discrimination unaffected. The results supported the tenability of the auxiliary assumption. We further discuss limitations and theoretical implications of these findings in the General Discussion.
General Discussion
We set out to test the invariance assumption for the dominant process of process-dissociation models in three prominent domains of application of these models. The problems to be solved for that purpose were that independent measures of the dominant process in the inclusion condition and exclusion condition are typically not available (Jacoby, 1991; Komatsu et al., 1995; Toth et al., 1995) , on the one hand, and that the database in process-dissociation paradigms is typically not structurally rich enough to support independent estimates of the dominant process under inclusion and exclusion conditions, on the other hand.
One conceptually simple solution is to capitalize on manipulations believed to affect the nondominant process, and to leave the dominant process unchanged in order to acquire the additional degrees of freedom that allow one to tease apart separate estimates of the contribution of the dominant process in the inclusion and exclusion conditions. A second approach is to enrich the database by extending the set of response options via a skip option. A related third possibility not pursued here is to extend the set of response options by asking for ratings of the confidence in each response (e.g., Bröder, Kellen, Schütz, & Rohrmeier, 2013; . The skip option and confidence ratings are most easily implemented for memory paradigms and are perhaps less suitable for paradigms with an emphasis on response speed (such as the Stroop task and the weapon task).
In implementing these ideas, we made an effort to minimize concerns relating to possible violations of homogeneity and aggregation independence. Violations of homogeneity occur if there is variability in the model parameters across the trials over which researchers aggregate for data analyses, such as across participants, items, and/or participant-item combinations. Violations of aggregation independence occur if model parameters correlate across these trials. As explained in the introduction, violations of homogeneity lead to distorted estimates of standard errors, confidence intervals, and bias in significance tests for the parameter estimates of the dominant and nondominant process. Violations of aggregation independence lead to distorted parameter estimates of the nondominant process in process-dissociation models.
A second common thread of the present work is therefore to deal with possible violations of homogeneity and aggregation independence. Following the lead of Rouder et al. (2008) , this is achieved through the use of hierarchical models that incorporate item and participant effects, and thereby account for variability in, and correlations between, the model parameters across items, participants, and, in part, even across item-participant combinations, dealing with item-participant interactions.
In each of three domains, we implemented a manipulation that has been argued in prior work to affect only the nondominant process, while leaving the dominant process unaffected. An auxiliary assumption is thus that the manipulation indeed leaves the dominant process unaffected. Evidence for the assumption from the process-dissociation literature rests on empirical dissociations in which the manipulation selectively influenced the nondominant process, but not the dominant process. But as already discussed, such dissociations may arise artifactually as a consequence of different combinations of violations of homogeneity, aggregation independence, and the invariance assumptions for the dominant and nondominant processes (e.g., Brainerd et al., 1999; Ratcliff et al., 1995) .
For such reasons, a third common thread of the present work is that we double-check for the influence of auxiliary assumptions in each tested domain in several ways. First, we implement three levels of the just-discussed manipulation to enable meaningful model checks, whereas previous work established only two levels. With only two levels, the baseline Model M 1 formulated for each domain would have been a saturated model implying limited possibilities for model checks (Batchelder & Riefer, 1999) , whereas with three levels, there are degrees of freedom left for more meaningful and statistically powerful model checks. Model checks assess whether the ensemble of model assumptions, includThis document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
ing the auxiliary assumption, can account for the data (satisfying a postulate by Brainerd et al., 1999 ; see also Ratcliff et al., 1995) . Second, model comparisons assess whether the Model M 1 incorporating the auxiliary assumption provides a better account of the data, taking model complexity into account, than processdissociation models that are as similar as possible to M 1 , while enforcing the invariance assumption, but not the auxiliary assumption. Finally and importantly, a second study is run for each tested domain for control purposes. In the second study, we either assess the tenability of the auxiliary assumption more directly (as for the Stroop task and the weapon task), or we assess its role for the conclusions by implementing an alternative test of the invariance assumption based on a conceptually different auxiliary assumption (as for the habit-recollection paradigm). Remember also that the auxiliary assumptions for the Stroop task and for the habitrecollection paradigm have been introduced and endorsed by the proponents of the process-dissociation models for these domains.
In what follows, we briefly review the major results for the three tested domains before addressing wider implications of our methods and findings.
The Stroop Task
The process-dissociation model of the Stroop task differs from most process-dissociation models, in that the dominant processword reading-is conceptualized as the automatic rather than the controlled process, whereas the nondominant process-color naming-is the controlled process rather than the automatic one. The test of the invariance assumption for the process-dissociation model of the Stroop task (Study 1) found evidence for a substantial violation of the assumption. Word-reading processes, as estimated by Parameter W, contributed much more to the responses to congruent than to incongruent Stroop stimuli.
Theoretically, this violation of the invariance assumption meshes well with recent findings of modulation of the Stroop effect at the item level (Jacoby et al., 2003) , and lends support to approaches that assume a role for repetition priming in the making of the Stroop effect (Blais et al., 2007) . Each individual congruent item is presented more frequently than each individual incongruent item, leading via repetition priming to an associative shortcut to the appropriate response for the frequent congruent items (Logan, 1990) . This would further strengthen the association between the item and the response based on word meaning for the congruent items, boosting Parameter W for these items. Alternatively, participants might learn that control, prioritizing color naming relative to word reading (Blais et al., 2007) , can be relaxed for the frequent congruent items, whereas no such learning can take place for the incongruent items, leading to a greater contribution of wordreading processes for the congruent items than for the incongruent items. In both cases, however, Parameter W would measure more than word reading, namely, differential effects of repetition priming or contingency learning, or differential amounts of inhibition of word-reading processes for congruent and incongruent items.
Whereas these possibilities suggest that a relaxed processdissociation model with separate Parameters W I and W E for inclusion and exclusion conditions may be a viable model of the task, we speculated that the large violation of the invariance assumption could also be an expression of a more fundamental misspecification of the process-dissociation model for the Stroop task, pointing to problems with the basic idea that two processes of word reading and color naming operate relatively independently of each other (Trainham et al., 1997) . Note that prominent alternative theories of the Stroop task (e.g., Blais et al., 2007; Cohen et al., 1990; Melara & Algom, 2003) are not consistent with this simple architecture. As a possible next step, research manipulating contingency learning and inhibitory processes in the Stroop task should be able to shed more light on the viability of the relaxed Model M 1 .
The Habit-Recollection Paradigm
In several independent tests of the invariance assumption for the habit-recollection paradigm (Hay & Jacoby, 1996) , we found that expectancy-violating (untypical) items consistently enjoyed a mnemonic advantage over expected (typical) items in violation of the invariance assumption.
Theoretically, the violation of the invariance assumption is in accord with theories and findings regarding the role of expectancies and expectancy violations in memory processes. In particular, a frequent observation in different content domains is that expectancy-violating items enjoy a memory advantage, perhaps because they instigate deeper and more elaborate encoding processes than expected items (e.g., Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005; Graesser & Nakamura, 1982; Hastie, 1981; Sherman et al., 1998) . These theories and findings would furthermore lead one to expect an increase in the advantage for expectancy-violating items as expectancy strength increases. We believe that the relaxed processdissociation model without invariance assumption may be a viable model for the habit-recollection paradigm that may find support in further empirical studies aimed at its validation.
The Weapon Task
The test of the invariance assumption for the weapon task found that racial bias is mediated by an effect of race on discrimination. Previous research has mostly assumed that race exerts a direct effect on response bias, mediating racial bias in the data. Note, however, that this previous attribution is not an empirical finding, but the result of a tacit a priori assumption-the invariance assumption (Klauer & Voss, 2008) : Response bias is the only place left for the model with invariance assumption to accommodate racial bias of the shape found in Figure 7 (left half). Once the invariance assumption is relaxed, the racial bias in participants' responses is found to be mapped on the discrimination parameters rather than on response bias. This is now an empirical finding, given that none of the model assumptions of M 1 a priori forces racial bias in the frequency data to map on either response bias or the discrimination parameters.
These findings therefore suggest that large portions of the findings and conclusions obtained with the weapon task have to be reinterpreted with as-yet unclear and unexplored theoretical and practical consequences for the possibility to shape, and perhaps eliminate, racial bias in the task. According to our findings, race colors the early perception and interpretation of incoming bits of information about the nature of the target picture, so that ambiguous pieces of information (e.g., a metal shaft) are interpreted in a more threatening way (e.g., as part of a gun rather than a screwdriver) when preceded by a Black face rather than a White face. In contrast, we found no support for the conventional (a priori) This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
assumption that race directly induces a response bias favoring the stereotype-congruent response. However, we do not wish to claim that we have resolved the open debate on how racial bias in weapon-task data is mediated (e.g., Klauer & Voss, 2008; Payne et al., 2005; Wentura & Degner, 2010) in more than a tentative and preliminary way, given that the results pattern for the weapon task was perhaps the weakest for the three domains tested: The basic Model M 1 provided a satisfactory fit of the data only after three participants were excluded, and the model-comparison exercise contrasting M 1 against models with invariance assumption intact did not bring unambiguous results.
Wider Implications
As this project proceeded, we were surprised by the relative ease with which violations of the invariance assumption were found, as well as by their sometimes substantial size. In the different domains tested, this outcome may reflect different underlying causes with different consequences. For example, for the Stroop task, we speculated that the substantial violation of the invariance assumption could be an expression of more fundamental problems of the process-dissociation model for the Stroop task than a violation of only the invariance assumption, whereas for the habit-recollection paradigm, we felt it more plausible that the relaxed processdissociation model with different parameters for the dominant process in inclusion and exclusion conditions might be a viable model. Further research is required in each of the three tested domains to validate or disconfirm the tentative interpretations that we offered. But a number of general implications and recommendations can also be formulated.
What the present work suggests, quite forcefully, is that the invariance assumption cannot be assumed to hold by default, and that it needs to be scrutinized and justified both theoretically and empirically in each and every specific application. One way to justify it theoretically is to design inclusion and exclusion conditions so that they differ as little as possible in (a) the relevant input to the dominant process operates, and (b) in terms of its assumed outcomes.
For example, the seminal two-list recognition-memory paradigm was criticized because the dominant process, recollection, needs to make available information about the list origin of the recollected item to be effective in the exclusion condition, but not in the inclusion condition, suggesting that a stricter kind of recollection is implied in the exclusion than in the inclusion condition (Graf & Komatsu, 1994) . But Brainerd and colleagues (Brainerd & Reyna, 2008; Brainerd et al., 2012) proposed what they called the mirror exclusion condition in which items are to be called "old" when they stem from List 1 (rather than from List 2, as in the original exclusion condition). The mirror exclusion condition leads to the same model prediction for "old" responses to List 1 items as the inclusion condition of the original paradigm (i.e., P [response "old"] ϭ R ϩ [1 -R]F). At the same time, it is much more plausible that preconditions and outcomes of recollection are comparable for the pair of exclusion and mirror exclusion conditions than for the original pair of exclusion and inclusion conditions. Brainerd and colleagues (Brainerd & Reyna, 2008; Brainerd et al., 2012 ) went on to propose extended process-dissociation models that both enlarge the database structurally by additional test conditions as well as enrich the model itself by adding specialized guessing and memory processes. These databases and second-generation dissociation models are regularly rich enough to permit explicit tests of the implied invariance assumptions along with overall tests of goodness of fit of the model. We expect many current simple process-dissociation models to eventually evolve into similarly extended secondgeneration process-dissociation models under the pressure of findings as reported here.
For many current process-dissociation models, there is, however, insufficient symmetry between what the dominant process is assumed to achieve in the inclusion and exclusion conditions, rendering the invariance assumption doubtful on theoretical grounds. For example, a recent process-dissociation model deals with the illusion-of-truth effect (Moons et al., 2009) : Repeated statements are perceived as more valid than novel ones (see also Begg et al., 1992) . Here, the invariance assumption claims that the probability with which controlled, analytic processing of arguments (the dominant process) suggests agreement for strong arguments (inclusion condition) is equal to the probability with which such processing suggests disagreement for weak arguments (exclusion condition). Inclusion and exclusion conditions thus differ both in terms of the relevant input to the dominant process (strong vs. weak arguments) and in terms of outcome (agreement vs. disagreement with the argument). Hence, a claim of invariance between inclusion and exclusion conditions would probably require careful calibration of the strengths of the weak and strong arguments using empirical tests of the kind proposed here to gain plausibility.
Similarly, Conway and Gawronski's (2013) recent processdissociation model of moral decision making addresses the question of whether intrinsically (deontologically) questionable actions (e.g., torturing a suspect) can be judged acceptable on utilitarian grounds, that is, because their distal consequences are desirable (e.g., many lives are saved as a consequence of the action). The dominant process is the evaluation of utilitarian grounds for the action. The invariance assumption claims that the probability of judging a questionable action with desirable distal consequences acceptable on utilitarian grounds (exclusion condition) is the same as the probability of judging the same action unacceptable on utilitarian grounds when its distal consequences are less desirable (e.g., instead of saving lives, only minor damage of objects is averted; inclusion condition). Again, inclusion and exclusion conditions differ with respect to both the relevant input to the dominant process, (i.e., in terms of the desirability of the distal consequences) and with respect to the outcomes (i.e., the action is evaluated as acceptable vs. unacceptable). Hence, a claim of invariance between inclusion and exclusion conditions would probably require careful calibration of the distal desirable and undesirable consequences using empirical tests of the kind proposed here to gain plausibility.
Importantly, however, the present studies showed that theoretical plausibility is not enough. Even when he inclusion and exclusion conditions seem well matched a priori in terms of relevant input and outcomes such as for all three domains considered here, empirical tests may still reveal substantial violations of the assumption, necessitating as a minimum revision of the models under scrutiny. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Conclusion
The class of process-dissociation models is one of the best understood classes of models used in experimental psychology. The models are members of the family of multinomial models (Batchelder & Riefer, 1999 ) that have seen a suite of important methodological developments in recent years (e.g., Klauer, 2006 Klauer, , 2010 Matzke et al., 2013; Smith & Batchelder, 2008 , 2010 Wu, Myung, & Batchelder, 2010a , 2010b ; see also Rouder et al., 2008) . Moreover, since the introduction of process-dissociation models by Jacoby (1991) , important debates have addressed fundamental assumptions, leading, in many cases, to conceptual clarifications and to extended models that address identified issues. One issue that has so far defied empirical clarification is the invariance assumption for the dominant process. For the nondominant process, it has often been possible to obtain independent measures through the use of neutral items, new items, or guessing items, as the case may be, separately for inclusion and exclusion conditions, and to incorporate them in extended models dealing with violations of the invariance assumption for the nondominant process. But no such separate proxies, in general, have been identified for the dominant process, rendering tests of the invariance hypothesis difficult.
The analogy of the process-dissociation model and the twohigh-threshold model of recognition memory already noted by Jacoby et al. (1993) , along with recent advances in the development of hierarchical modeling (in particular, Rouder et al., 2008) have, however, opened up ways to test the invariance assumption for the dominant process in a manner that takes possible distorting effects of aggregation bias into account. The present work builds on these advances to extend the process-dissociation database structurally so as to gain the degrees of freedom required to tease apart separate estimates of the dominant process for the inclusion condition and for the exclusion condition.
Putting the invariance assumption to test conceptually and empirically often reveals fundamental theoretical preconceptions that went into the construction of the process-dissociation model, as exemplified for the weapon task, or has theoretical consequences for the interpretation of the nature of the processes, as exemplified for the Stroop task and the habit-recollection paradigm. Moreover, undetected substantial violations of the invariance assumption and aggregation bias have potentially crippling effects for the soundness of conclusions drawn from process-dissociation analyses, as amply discussed and illustrated in this paper. At the same time, conceptual scrutiny of the invariance assumption often reveals plausible arguments for why the invariance assumption may be violated in a given domain, as exemplified for a number of domains reviewed in the course of this article. For these reasons, research employing process-dissociation models should assess the assumption empirically whenever possible. Like Yonelinas and Jacoby (2012) , we value the simplicity of the process-dissociation approach and would hope that it survives many such tests unchanged.
